This paper estimates short horizon exchange rate sensitivity with an event study methodology. We look at stock price reactions to very large, unexpected exchange rate changes: the decisions to allow the Mexican peso and Thai baht to float. Whereas other studies of US multinational companies fail to confirm a short horizon relation between exchange rates and stock prices, we do find evidence of a contemporaneous relation. We conclude that, for firms with direct exposure to a country in a currency crisis, investors do immediately adjust their expectations of firm value in response to currency changes.
two problems with this method. First, over most of the periods covered in these studies, the trade weighted value of the dollar changes very little over a one-month period, making it difficult to observe any links to market value changes. For example, during the 1980s, the average of the absolute value of monthly changes in the International Monetary Funds' (IMF) nominal and real trade weighted dollar indices are 1.7 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively. It is difficult to envision stock prices responding to 1-2 percent mont hly changes in exchange rates that could be random draws from a stable distribution, i.e. noise.
Second, it is doubtful that the exchange rate exposure of any given company matches the trade weights used to measure the exchange rate, making it unlikely that firm value changes will correspond closely to exchange rate index changes.
As an alternative, our approach measures the impact of a large, unexpected change in a bilateral exchange rate on the stock prices of firms that we know have operations in that particular foreign country. We look at two different events: when Mexico allowed the peso to float in December of 1994, and when the Thai baht was allowed to float in July of 1997.
See the Appendix for a summary of these events. Both were large, unexpected exchange rate changes. 5 The change in value of these currencies against the dollar over a week around the events was 35.0 and 16.6 percent, respectively. We use disclosures of foreign operations recorded in the 2000 Standard and Poor's Compustat Business Information file to build our two samples of firms that had either sales or assets in Mexico or Asia during the fiscal year prior to the respective event dates. (The Compustat data base does not provide information about Thai assets or sales, so we must include all firms that report exposure in a set of Asian countries.)
We then use several methods to examine how the stock prices of these firms react on and around these exchange rate events. With all of our methods, we find strong evidence of a contemporaneous relation between exchange rates and the stock prices of US multinational firms in the sample of firms with exposure to the Mexican Peso in 1994. Further tests suggest that the relation is economically as well as statistically significant. Conversely, we find no evidence of abnormal returns in the Thai sample. Although several explanations are possible, we believe that this result is due to unavoidable sample selection problems. We conclude that, for firms with direct exposure to a country in a currency crisis, there is a contemporaneous relation: investors do immediately adjust their expectations of firm value in response to currency changes.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the section I we discuss our sample selection criteria and our me thods for calculating stock price reactions on the event dates. In section II we present the statistical tests, in section III we discuss the economic significance of the results, in section IV we interpret the results, and in section V we conclude.
I. Samples, Measures, and Tests of Significance

A. Samples
Sample firms come from the 2000 Standard and Poor's Compustat Business Information file. The Business Information file provides data on sales, profits, depreciation, capital expenditures, and identifiable assets by geographic region. Financial Accounting Standard no. 14, published in December 1976, requires U.S. companies to disclose geographical information about foreign operations if such operations account for more than 5 While well-publicized macroeconomic problems in these countries may have lead many investors to expect a devaluation, they could not have known with certainty if or when it would occur. To the extent that the events 10 percent of total operations. In addition, a number of companies voluntarily report geographical information even when they do not meet this threshold. Because company policies regarding transfer prices and cost allocations make the distinction between foreign and domestic sales and profits somewhat arbitrary, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board allows companies considerable latitude in interpreting their geographical reporting requirements. In addition, the firms are not required to disclose the exact nature of their foreign operations, for example, whether foreign assets are used for full scale production or final assembly. As a result, for the firms that chose to report foreign assets or sales, we can reliably identify where a firm operates, but not exactly what its operations are. For firms that do not report foreign sales or assets, or do not break out the foreign information in detail, we must assume that they do not operate in Mexico or Thailand.
We select US incorporated firms that report both domestic sales and some information about sales or assets in the following regions (Compustat Code): Mexico (63);
and, Asia (20) , Pacific (40), Japan (21), Australia (41), and Philippines (22). 6 There is no geographic code provided for Thailand. For the Thai baht event, we inc lude companies with broadly defined Asian operations on the presumption that Asian economies are sufficiently integrated that significant currency problems in Thailand will be perceived by investors to threaten contagion effects throughout the region. The daily firm and market returns and market capitalization come from the 2000 Center for Research of Stock Prices (CRSP) database. We use only those firms having data in both the Compustat and CRSP databases. 
B. Measures
In general, event studies have adopted two approaches to determine whether or not stock prices react to a specific event: event parameter regressions and abnormal returns. We 6 We include firms providing data for these regions that are combined with data for regions that are not applicable to this study.
will use both in this study. In the typical event parameter approach, individual firm (or, portfolio) data are regressed against a market model, with an event dummy variable (D), set equal to one over the event window. The specification is 1)
where R t is the return on the stock or portfolio on day or month t, R mt is the return on a US market index on day or month t, and ε is a random error term. The event study test of interest is whether or not β 2 differs significantly from zero. With multiple firms, one can stack the individual time series and run specification #1 as a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR).
This allows for three tests: 1) is β 2i equal to zero for each firm, 2) is the sum of β 2i s over all firms equal to zero, and 3) are all β 2i s equal to zero?
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As Schipper and Thompson (1983, 1985) note, a virtue of SUR is that it accommodates a high level of cross sectional correlation due to clustering of event days. In the presence of event date clustering, one cannot assume that the covariance between abnormal returns are zero, and as a result, standard significance tests may be biased, although coefficient estimates are not. Here the event (for each country) is the same date for all sample firms, so event clustering is a real possibility.
One problem with the SUR method is the statistical requirement for hypothesis tests that the number of time-series observations be greater than twice the number of sample firms plus one. With a Mexico sample of 316, this means we would need more than 633 daily 7 The second test is equivalent to testing whether the abnormal returns in an equally weighted portfolio differ from zero over the event window.
observations. To circumvent this problem, we do two things. First, we run specification #1 with an equal weighted portfolio of returns for the full sample. Dann and James (1982) and Karpoff and Malatesta (1995) point out that this method controls for biases introduced by event date clustering. Second, we group sample firms into a small number of common-size and industry portfolios and conduct standard SUR tests on these stacked portfolios. Our intent is to form portfolios of firms that might have similar currency exposures. Chow, Lee and Solt (1997a) , and Bodnar and Wong (2000) find evidence that currency exposure varies by firm size. Numerous papers have also found systematic differences in exposure by industry, a result consistent with the idea that firms in a given industry tend to have similar profiles with respect to their cross border operations. 8 We group our size portfolios according to the CRSP size-based deciles. Given the relatively large concentration of big firms in both samples, approximately 1/3 are in the largest decile, we do not simply rank the firms and form 10 portfolios of equal size. This approach would result in grouping the bottom 4 or 5 deciles into the smallest portfolio.
Instead, our 10 portfolios correspond to the 10 CRSP size-based deciles, with each sample firm allocated to a portfolio according to its size. We form our industry portfolios according to industry groupings given by K. French.
9 These estimations allow us to test whether there is an exchange rate effect within any one of the portfolios, and across all portfolios.
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8 See, for example, Jorion (1991) , Chow, Lee, and Solt (1997b) , Bodnar and Gentry (1993) . Note, Choi and Prasad (1995) offer an opposing view that exposure is firm specific and thus tests using portfolios may not be able to find much evidence of exchange rate exposure. We estimate all of the regressions over a period beginning 240 days prior to day 0 of the event and ending 61 days prior to day 0, with the event period appended on to the end of the series. We calculate two event windows (both here and in the abnormal return approach below): two days (0,+1), and seven-days (-1,+5). Since we are interested in the stock price reaction to the news of a decision to allow the currency to float, we define day 0 as the date that the decision was announced and day 1 as the date that the Wall Street Journal reported the decisions (day 0 is December 20, 1994 for Mexico, and July 2,1997 for Thailand).
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We estimate the regressions with three different measures of market returns (R mt ): the CRSP equally weighted index (EW), the CRSP value weighted index (VW), and the S&P500 index (S&P). In a recent working paper, Bodnar and Wong (2000) demonstrate that timeseries measures of exchange rate sensitivity at horizons of one month or longer are sensitive to which market index is used. They argue that this sensitivity is due to a strong sizeexposure relation for US firms and conclude that an equal weighted index is superior. To see if measures of exposure at very short horizons are also sensitive to the market index, we do all tests with the three different market indices.
A key shortcoming of the event parameter approach, as we must implement it, is that we do not get measures of individual firm abnormal returns. Buy and Hold market adjusted return equals:
11 As noted in the Appendix, Mexico first devalued the peso by 13 percent on December 20 and then allowed it to float on December 22. Given the closeness of these dates, we use the initial devaluation as our base event.
2)
where a is the first day in the event window and b is the last.
Market adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) are estimated with a market model over a daily period prior to the event date. We use a 180 day period that ends 61 days prior to the event.
3) where ε is a random error term. The estimated alpha and beta from this equation are used to calculate residual performance, or an abnormal return (AR), for each day in the event window.
4)
The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are the individual-day abnormal returns cumulated over a specified event window. In specification #4, AR would be equivalent to the Dummy coefficient estimate in the event parameter specification (equation #1 above) when applied to
The 7-day window includes both actions. individual firm data, with Dummy set equal to 1 for one event date. The CAR would be equivalent to the sum of single-day event Dummy coefficients from specification #1.
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A number of event studies, for both the event parameter and abnormal return calculations, adjust returns for additional factors beyond the US market index. Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) note that the gains from this strategy, in terms of reducing variance, are greatest when "the sample firms have a common characteristic." Our samples include only firms with known operations in Mexico or Thailand (Asia). As a result, we also calculate the event parameter regressions and the abnormal returns adjusting for the foreign market stock index, as well as the domestic market index. For the Thai sample, we estimate results with the local Thai index and with a Regional Asia Index. All indices are from Datastream, their total market index for Mexico and Thailand, and their Asia ex-Japan index for the regional index. The specifications are:
5)
Where R ft equals the foreign market index return.
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12 The most commonly used measure of abnormal returns for event studies of this type is the CAR. The buy and hold returns are typically used for studies where there is insufficient data prior to the event to calculate alphas and betas (e.g., IPOs). For comparison and completeness, we calculate both CARs and B&Hs and find that the results are very similar across measures. 13 We cannot calculate a revised Buy and Hold return because it does not make sense to simply subtract the full foreign stock index return from the Buy and Hold return. The impact of the foreign index on an individual firm's returns will differ depending on the nature of its exposure.
II. Results of Statistical Tests
We want to answer three questions: do firms with foreign exchange exposure evidence statistically significant stock price reactions immediately following currency float announcements, how do these reactions vary cross-sectionally across exposed firms, and are the reactions economically significant? This section answers the first 2 questions. We present the results of our event parameter and SUR specifications, tests of significance of individual firm exposure, and results of cross sectional regressions with the abnormal returns as the dependent variable. The following section discusses the economic significance of the results. Table II contains the results of our OLS regressions of an equa lly weighted portfolio of the sample firm returns against a market model and an event Dummy set equal to 1 over a 2-or 7-day window. The Mexico sample results are on the left and the Thailand results are on the right. We are interested in the coefficient estimate on the event Dummy. A statistically significant coefficient indicates that on average the sample firms had an abnormal stock price reaction around the currency float decisions. It is important to recall that lack of a significant coefficient does not necessarily mean no reaction. Some of these firms could have a negative currency exposure while some could have a positive exposure, canceling each other out in the portfolio.
A. Event Parameter Specification
Focusing first on Mexico, we see that the event Dummy coefficient is always significantly different from zero when the Mexican market index is also included in the regression. Out of the six coefficient estimates across the 2 windows, 2 are significant at the 1 percent level, 3 at the 5 percent level, and 1 at the 10 percent level. The coefficient point estimates indicate that on any day in the event window, the portfolio's abnormal return ranges from 0.0024 (or, 0.24%) to 0.0078. When only a US market index is included, only one event Dummy coefficient estimate differs significantly from zero, the 7-day window with the equally weighted US market index. That coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level.
None of the Thai event Dummy coefficient estimates differ significantly from zero.
This result could be due to any, or some combination of, three reasons: 1) no reaction in fact, 2) no reaction in this sample portfolio because we have firms that do business in Asia but not necessarily in Thailand, and 3) no reaction due to the averaging effect of including firms with positive and negative exposure in the portfolio. Unfortunately, these results and those that follow do not allow us to definitively determine the relative importance of these reasons.
B. SUR Results
Tables III and IV contain the results from our SUR estimations of specification #1 with the sample firms grouped into size and industry portfolios. Table III reports The results in Table III provide Looking at results across size portfolios, we see that most of the significant results appear to be in the upper-mid size portfolios (deciles 6 through 9). Indeed, deciles 6 and 7 are significant in both 2-day specifications, while deciles 8 and 9 are significant in both 7-day windows. Portfolios 6, 8, and 9 are significantly positive, while portfolio 7 is significantly negative. The results for the Thai SUR regressions are not provided, but are available upon request from the authors. In only one case is the event dummy coefficient significant ly different from zero: 2-day window, industry portfolio 1 (Consumer Non-durables), all market indices, at the 5 or 10 percent level.
In sum, the SUR regressions provide strong evidence of a significant stock price reaction to the currency devaluations in the 2-day window for Mexico (size and industry portfolios). Significant effects appear concentrated in the upper-mid size firms (size deciles 6-9) and in several industries, including manufacturing, telephone and tv, and business equipment. Almost all significant coefficient estimates are positive, indicating benefits from the dollar appreciation. The Thai results indicate a significant abnormal return in only one portfolio, consumer non-durables, and no significance in the overall test of all event dummy coefficients.
C. Individual firm results
To test how these reactions vary cross-sectionally across exposed firms, we first ask how many individual firm reactions are statistically significant. To answer this question, we regress the time series of daily firm returns against a constant, a market index (US or US and foreign), and an event Dummy (i.e., apply specification #1 or #5 above to individual firm data). Table V reports the percentage of firms where the t-statistic for the event Dummy coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. If the event period return is purely random, we would expect 2.5 percent of the cases to end up in each tail. For Mexico, the number of firms in the positive tail, for all 2-day window results and some 7-day window results, is clearly above 2.5 percent. The total number of firms in both the positive and negative tails is about 8 percent for the 2-day window measures and about 4 percent for the 7-day window measures. This compares to 5.2 percent significant firm results at the 5 percent level in Jorion (1990) , and 15 percent significant (at the 10 percent level) in Choi and Prasad (1995) .
14 For the Thai sample, the total number of firms in the tails equals between 2 and 6 percent, and is clearly not statistically significant. Consistent with prior US research, we thus find only modest evidence of individual firm reactions to exchange rate changes.
D. Cross Sectional Regressions
Table VI reports the results of cross sectional regressions, where the absolute value of either CAR or CAR2 is the dependent variable, and log(market capitalization) and foreign/total sales are the independent variables. While larger firms may have more international operations and competitors, they also tend to have more sophisticated treasury and hedging operations. As a result, we expect to find a negative relation between the size of exposure and the size of the firm. Foreign/total sales appears as a proxy for the extent of exposure, with the expectation that more foreign operations will be associated with higher measures of exposure. Consistent with Chow, Lee, and Solt (1997a) , in both the Mexico and Thai samples, we find a significant negative coefficient on size, indicating larger firms have smaller exposure estimates, and insignificant coefficient estimates on Foreign/Total Sales, indicating no impact from the size of foreign operations on the level of exposure. When we substitute a more refined measure of exposure to the region, Mexican/total sales instead of Foreign/total sales for example, the sample size drops dramatically (to N=24) and the coefficient estimates on the exposure variable never differ significantly from zero, results not reported.
III. Economic Significance
At first blush, our observed stock price elasticities of U.S. multinational firms to changes in exchange rates appear modest. Table VII reports So, in Mexico, a 35 percent drop in the peso over the 7-day event window is coincident with a one to three percentage point mean abnormal return for exposed firms. The smallest exposure estimate equals 0.99 percent (CAR(VW)), the largest equals 3.07 percent (CAR2(S&P)). We see three possible reasons why the true elasticities may be larger than these numbers suggest: a downward bias caused by exchange rate sensitivity in the market index; an averaging effect caused by combining firms with positive and negative exposure;
and a scale effect. We will discuss each of these effects in turn.
Bodnar and Wong (2000) and Priestley and Odegaard (2001) argue that measures of exchange rate elasticity that control for general market movements may be biased downward because the market index itself may reflect some currency exposure. To the extent that the market index reflects currency exposure, and the elasticity estimate takes out any correlation with the market index, any estimates of individual firm (or, industry) exposure will be biased downward. 15 To test for this possibility, we regress the daily returns for the US market indices (EW, S&P, and VW) against the Mexican peso and against the Thai baht from event day t=-240 to t=+5, including an event window dummy. The coefficient estimates on the exchange rate and on the event dummy are never significantly different from zero. As a result, we do not believe that our measures of elasticity are appreciably affected by market index-currency correlations.
The averaging of returns across firms with positive and negative exposures is a muc h more likely source of downward bias. Recall that we are observing the net effect of offsetting positive and negative currency exposures. 16 For a closer look at the possible magnitude of positive and negative exposure, we separate the positive and negative exposure firms into two sub-samples and report their means separately in Table VIII . For example, the mean 2-day CAR2(EW) reaction in the Mexico sample is 3.72 percent for firms with a positive stock price reaction and -2.54 percent for firms with a negative stock price reaction.
This compares with the mean reaction across all firms of 0.65 percent, reported in Table VII .
For the 7-day CAR2(EW) returns the means are 5.88 percent and -4.35 percent, respectively, compared to the mean across all firms of 2.02.
These split-sample means suggest considerably higher elasticity estimates than the full sample means. Moreover, the numbers appear broadly consistent with earlier studies. In the 2-day window, the Mexican peso depreciated by 15.35%. The coefficient estimates in Table VIII suggest that stock prices rose 3 to 4 percent for firms with positive exposure and fell 2 to 3 percent for firms with negative exposure. Choi and Prasad (1995) , looking at monthly returns of US firms over 1978-89 estimate that on average a 1 percent depreciation of the dollar is associated with a 0.15% increase in the firm's stock return. Bartov and Bodnar (1994) report that they can generate a 3.05 percent abnormal return over a 60-day trading period by selling short and buying long shares of firms with known exposure following periods when the value of the dollar changes more than 5 percent per quarter.
Finally, we want to consider scale effects. One can look at the economic significance of US multinational's foreign exchange exposure from two perspectives. The more conventional perspective considers the sensitivity of the firm's equity return to changes in the exchange rate. A second perspective considers the sensitivity of the firm's exposed cash flows to changes in the exchange rate. If only 5 percent of a company's cash flows are exposed to the peso, a 20 percent increase in the dollar value of those cash flows due to a change in the exchange rate will result in only a 1 percent change in total firm equity value.
In this manner, small total firm effects may mask large sensitivities of exposed cash flows to exchange rate changes. Table IX that when the ratio of Mexican to total cash flows is small, the implied revision to the value of Mexican cash flows can be quite large. To avoid distortions caused by such outliers, we focus on the medians. There, the 2-day window estimates suggest that revisions to the perceived value of Mexican cash flows range from 17 to 47 percent for the positive revisions and -25 to -32 percent for the negative revisions. These ranges are suggestive of the magnitude of change in investor perceptions of the value of foreign operations, as represented by the relatively small changes in total value.
In sum, these results suggest that the contemporaneous exchange rate exposure is economically as well as statistically significant.
IV. Interpretation
Statistical tests reveal that US firms with Mexican exposure evidence significant stock price reactions to the 1994 peso float. The same tests, however, display three curious patterns that merit further consideration:
1.
Strong evidence of a reaction with means, but weak evidence of individual firm reactions;
2. Positive abnormal returns in samples with mostly large firms, when prior studies find that large firms tend to be hurt by dollar appreciations; and 3. Positive abnormal returns when the Mexican bourse fell in dollar terms.
First, how do we interpret the joint findings that the portfolio abnormal returns of our samples differ from zero but relatively few individual firms have significant abnormal returns? We take the absence of a large number of firms in the tails of our distributions to indicate that while exchange rate change is a pervasive factor influencing the returns of exposed companies it is seldom a dominant factor. Individual firms will exhibit significant abnormal returns only if they have large foreign exchange exposure and they fail to mange that exposure. The pattern we observe is precisely what should occur when companies facing large currency risks (who might otherwise be in the tails of our distributions) actively employ financial market or operational hedges to moderate their exposures. The failure of most prior studies to identify a large number of firms with significant contemporaneous foreign exchange exposure may simply be due to the fact that most exposed firms hedge their exposure. And the somewhat better results observed using non-US samples might say more about the risk management skills of US companies than about underlying foreign exchange exposures.
The second curious pattern in the data is the generally positive mean abnormal returns, evidence that our firms are helped by the US dollar appreciation. As noted in the data section above, approximately 1/3 of both samples come from the largest decile of firms.
Yet, a number of papers, see Bodnar and Wong (2000) , have found evidence that over long horizons of many months large firms tend to be hurt by a dollar appreciation and small firms tend to be helped by an appreciation. The standard explanation for this finding is that larger firms tend to be multinationals and exporters, while smaller firms tend to import. Given the concentration of large firms in our samples, our finding of a positive impact from the dollar appreciation is curious.
There are at least two ways to reconcile our findings with previous research. First, our results relate to specific countries, while most previous research considers international currency exposure in the broad. In both our samples the fact that firms benefit on average A second way to reconcile our findings of a mean positive abnormal return with prior research is to distinguish between long-and short-run exposure. The repeated finding that large firms are hurt by dollar appreciation while small firms are helped refers to long-run exposure over several months or more. Chow, Lee, and Solt (1997) provide evidence classified by firm size and over multiple horizons. Over long horizons their results are consistent with others, but they also report that large firms exhibit lower exposure than small firms at all time horizons and that large firms exhibit smaller exposure at short horizons than long. Indeed, the exposure disappears entirely at short horizons. Consistent with Chow, Lee, and Solt, our SUR size portfolio results show no significant reactions in the largest decile firms and mostly positive reactions in the other deciles. Unlike Chow et al, we show the strongest reactions in the mid-size firms, rather than the smallest firms.
The third data pattern deserving of attention is the fact that over the event window the Mexican bourse fell sharply in dollar terms, yet US firm abnormal returns were positive. We interpret this finding as evidence that we are not simply observing a translation effect. If a firm has 10 percent of its value in Mexico and the dollar value of the peso falls 20 percent, we would expect, ceteris paribus, the firm's total value to fall 2 percent due simply to the restatement of the dollar value of its peso assets. Here, we observe that the mean sample CARs rose despite the decline in the dollar value of peso assets. In other words, the mean present value of sample firms' expected Mexican cash flows measured in dollars rose despite a negative translation effect.
This pattern raises a broader philosophical question of how to interpret the positive abnormal returns. Some could argue that the positive returns are simply reactions to the macroeconomic events that are occurring, rather than a currency exposure effect. This story may seem reasonable because the currency devaluation and float decisions, occurring in the midst of a broader crisis, are often interpreted as good news that the government is finally responding to the crisis. If this were the whole story, however, we would expect all firms doing business in the country to exhibit positive abnormal returns that would vary by the extent of their operations in the affected country. We, on the other hand, find both positive and negative returns, and returns that vary by size and industry, but not by the level of operations in that country. Thus, we conclude that the observed abnormal returns primarily reflect currency exposure, rather than political or macroeconomic adjustments.
V. Conclusion
This paper revisits the question of exchange rate sensitivity with a new methodology, the event study. Our approach to testing for a contemporaneous exchange rate sensitivity encompasses measuring stock price changes on the dates of large, unexpected bilateral exc hange rate changes for firms that we know have an exposure to that specific currency.
Our primary finding is evidence supporting a contemporaneous relation between stock prices and exchange rates. For the Mexican peso event in 1994, we find evidence of significant stock price reactions to the currency float decision. We find that the abnormal return for firms with Mexican exposure was positive in the event window, for the overall sample and for select size and industry portfolios.
We find almost no evidence of significance in the Thai sample. Only one portfolio,
consumer non-durables, shows a significant abnormal return across all market index measures. The cross sectional regressions also show that the Thai sample CARs are significantly negatively related to firm size. We believe that the lack of results in the Thai sample is most likely due to unavoidable limitations in the sample selected, including the absence of information on Thai sales or assets and the averaging effects from combining firms with positive and negative exposure. The different results across the Mexican and Thai samples suggest that tests of exchange rate exposure are quite sensitive to sample definition and selection.
We conclude that for large exchange rate changes and a sample of firms with known currency exposure, there exists a contemporaneous relation between stock prices and currency changes. This evidence is consistent with the premise that the inability of much of the prior research to observe a contemporaneous relation between exchange rates and company value is due to effective company hedging as well as possible problems in sample selection. It is inconsistent with the assertion that investors are unable immediately to gauge the impact of foreign exchange rate change s on firm value. More fundamental reasons included a rising real exchange rate, a current account deficit projected to exceed 8 percent of gross domestic product, and rapidly dwindling reserves. Absent a convincing economic program to address Mexico's economic ills, financial markets reacted negatively to the the devaluation, and on December 22, with reserves diminishing rapidly, Mexico allowed the peso to float. This resulted in a further 16 percent fall in the peso, for a two-day decline of almost 30 percent. The decline during our 7-day event window was 35 percent.
THAILAND On July 2, 1997, after months of attacks by currency speculators, Prime Minister Chavalit
Yo ngchaiyudi triggered what has come to be called the Asian Crisis by allowing the Thai baht to float in currency markets. Formerly, the baht had been tied to a basket of currencies heavily weighted by the value of the dollar. Thailand was forced to effectively devalue its currency by a combination of factors including a large current account deficit, rising bad debts in the overheated property sector of the economy, an economic slowdown, political infighting, and rapidly falling foreign exchange reserves. The value of the baht fell 18.8 percent on July 2, and was down 16.6 percent over our 7-day event window. 
Table II Event Parameter OLS Regressions
This table reports ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficient estimates for samples of firms that break out sales or assets in Mexico or Asia in the fiscal year end prior to the event dates of December 20, 1994 for Mexico and July 2, 1997 for Thailand in the 2000 Compustat Business Information file. Period covered is 240 days prior to day zero and ending on day -61, with the event window days appended onto the end of the series. Specifications are:
Where t R is the equally weighted daily return on the full sample portfolio. USt R is the daily return on the US CRSP equally weighted index (EW), the S&P 500 index (S&P), or the CRSP value weighted index (VW). Dummy is a dummy variable set equal to one on event days (0,+1) for the 2-day window and (-1,+5) for the 7-day window. Where it R is the equally weighted daily return on a size-or industry-based portfolio. Size portfolios are formed by CRSP size-based deciles. Industry portfolios are formed according to industry breakdowns listed on K. French's home page. USt R is the daily return on the US CRSP equally weighted index (EW), the S&P 500 Index (S&P), or the CRSP value weighted index (VW). Dummy is a dummy variable set equal to one on event days (0,+1) for the 2-day window and (-1,+5) for the 7-day window. Where it R is the equally weighted daily return on a size-or industry-based portfolio. Size portfolios are formed by CRSP size-based deciles. Industry portfolios are formed according to industry breakdowns listed on K. French's home page. USt R is the daily return on the US CRSP equally weighted index. Dummy is a dummy variable set equal to one on event days (0,+1) for the 2-day window and (-1,+5) for the 7-day window. Where it R is the firm's daily return, USt R is the daily return on the US CRSP equally weighted index (EW), the S&P 500 index (S&P), or the CRSP value weighted index (VW). Dummy is a dummy variable set equal to one on event days (0,+1) for the 2-day window and (-1,+5) for the 7-day window.
Ft
R is the daily return on the Datastream total market index for Mexico or Thailand.
Specification is estimated over event days -241 to -61, with the event days appended onto the end of the series. 
